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THE UNIFORM, RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE NORTH
DAKOTA LAW OF EVIDENCE (Continued)
By LEO H.

WHINEIiY*

BUILDEN OF PROOF'
I.

Burden of Proof and Burden of Producing Evidence
Distinguished

"Burden of proof" has often been used by the courts to describe
two entirely distinct and well recognized burdens which fall upon
the litigants in the fact-finding process. These are the:-oblig.ation to
persuade the trier of fact of the existence of facts and the obligation to produce evidence of the existence of those facts. 2 These two
burdens are separately defined in the Uniform Rules to distinguish
them clearly. Unilorm Rule 1(4)-provides:
"'Burden of Proof' means the obligation of a party to meet
the requirements of a rule of law that the fact be proved either"
by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case may be.
.Burden of proof is synonomous with 'burden of persuasion.'"
Rule 1(5) provides:
"'Burden of producing evidence' means the obligation of a
party to introduce evidence when necessary to avoid the risk
of a directed verdict or peremptory finding against him on a
material issue of fact."
Generally speaking, :there are two basic differences between
Uniform Rule 1(4) defining ."burden of proof" and the analogous
Model Code rule 1(3) defining what is there termed ihe "burden
of persuasion. , The first relates to the general form of the two
rules. Uniform Rule 1(4, defines "burden of proof" in terms of
the nature of the obligation of a party rather than in 'terms of
result as in Model Code rule 1(3), that is, defining it as" the obligation of a party to persuade the trier of the existence of a fact as
distinguished from defining it as the burden which is discharged
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1.
Other comparisoits of the burden of proof provisions of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence and state law include Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 399-400
(1956); Morgan, Presumptions, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 512 (1956); and McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 13 (1954).
2.
9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2485, 2487 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence §:306
(195 4), hereinafter cited as Wigmnore and McCormick respectively.
3. " 'Burden of persuasion of a fact' means the burden which is discharged when the
tribunal which is to determine the existence or non-existence of the fact is persuaded by
sufficient evidence to find that the fact exists."
Model Code of Evidence rule 1(3)
(1942), hereinafter cited as Model Code.
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when the trier is persuaded that the fact exists. 4 A similar difference exists in connection with the respective definitions of the
"burden of producing evidence" in Uniform Rule 1(5) and Model
Code rule 1(2)., The ration ale of the Model Code formulations is
set forth in the comments to the rules as follows:
"Neither the Rules nor the decisions require that the evidence discharging either burden shall have been introduced by
the party having the burden. The burden is not that of producing evidence or of persuading, but merely the burden of
carrying the risk of non-production or of non-persuasion. The
burden bearer must see to it that the evidence is before the
trier or that the trier is persuaded; but the evidence discharging the first burden may have been offered by the other party,
and the persuasive evidence or argument or both in discharge
of the second burden may also have come from him.""
Though this is true, it is not necessarily regarded as reason for
preferring the Model Code form over that of the Uniform Rules.
As to the burden of producing evidence, Uniform Rule 1(5) qualifies the obligation by specifying "when necessary". As to the burden of proof, this also seems largely taken care of by the wording
of Uniform Rule 1(4) in that it does not specify that the party
having the burden shall prove, but only that a party meet the requirements of a rule of law that the fact be proved. Since the
language of Uniform Rules 1(4) and 1(5) is "consistent with
traditional concepts" and there appear to be no substantial arguments for preferring one form over the other, the form of the definitions may be regarded as preferable to that of the Model Code
rules.
The second principal difference between Uniform Rule 1(4)
and Model Code rule 1(3) is that the Uniform Rule'employs the
three commonly accepted criteria for satisfying the burden of
proof: preponderance of evidence; clear and convincing evidence;
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As will be discussed later,
the inclusion of these tests within Uniform Rule 1(4), within cer7
tain limitations, can prove advantageous.
As to North Dakota, it requires no citation of authority for the
proposition that the distinction between the burden of proof and
4.
Handbook, Nat'l. Conf. of Coin. on Uniform State Laws 165 (1953), hereinafter
cited as Handbook. See also, McCormick,
307, who defines "burden of persuasion in
terms of the obligation of the party.
But compare Wigmore, § 2485, who speaks of the
"risk of non-persuasion".
5.
, 'Burden of producing 'evidence of a fact' means the burden which is discharged
when sufficient evidence is introduced -to support a finding that the fact exists."
Model
Code, rule 1(2).
6. Model Code, 74.
7.
See pages 209-213 infra.
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the burden of producing evidence is well recognized, though it
may be useful to note that the confusion arising out of the use of
"burden of proof" to describe these two distinct burdens has not
gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court and, in an early case, it very
clearly distinguished them by approving of "burden of proof" to
describe the obligation of persuasion and "burden of evidence" to
describe the obligation of producing evidence.'
II.

An Analysis of Burden of Proof9

As to the Obligation of the Parties. Uniform Rule 1(4) does not
spell out who has the burden of proof as to any particular issue of
fact. This is as it should be since there is no single criteria, suitable for allocating the burden of proof for all cases.1- It is true
that in civil cases, as a general rule, the burden of proof is cast
upon the party who must affirmatively plead as to a particular
issue of fact. 1 Thus, in North Dakota, for example, the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff as to the material allegations in his complaint,' or, where the defendant must plead affirmatively, the burden of proof rests with him.'2 And, in criminal cases, as a general
rule throughout the United States,' as well as in North Dakota,'5
the burden of proof falls upon the prosecution.
At most, however, the liles governing the burden of proof are
mere rules of thumb which can be relied upon in allocating the
burden of proof. They cannot be regarded as absolutes in determining for every case who may have the burden of proof.'o This
8.
Guild v. Moore, 32 N.D. 432, 155 N.W. 44 (1914). See also: MacDonald v. Fitzgerald, 42 N.D. 133, 171 N.W. 879 (1919).
9.
For reasons later given, I prefer the term "persuasion" to that' of "proof". See
with
page 206 infra. However, the ternm "proof" is used in this paper as synonbmous
'
"persuasion".'to be consistent with the Uniform Rules of Evidence as they are proposed.
10.
Wigmore, § 2486; McCormick, §, 318.
11., Clark, Code Pleading § 96 (2d ed. 1947). See also, McCormick § 318.
12. Guild v. Moore, 32 N.D. 432, 155 N.W. 44 (1915). See also, Lindberg v. Burton.
41 N.D. 587, 171 N.W. 616 (1919).
13. Kuhn v. Marquart, 45 NLD. 482, 178 N.W. 428 (1920).
14.
Wigmore, § 2497;, McCormick, § 318.
See also, State v.
15. State v. Schmidt, 72 N.D. 719, 10 N.W.2d 868 ;(1943).
Tennyson, 73 N.D. 254, 14 N.W.2d 171 (1944), holding that the time within, which an
offense is- committed is a jurisdictional fact and that the state has. the burden of proving
affirmatively the commission, of the offense within the period, prescribed by the applicable
,lb.
statute of limitations.
16. As to, civil cases, for example, in some cases it has been held that the burden is
on the person who has a negative averment to prove (Wigmore, § 2486) and, in. others,
(Wigmore, § 2486)
on the person who has peculiar krnuwledge of the facts alleged.
As to these exceptions, see Professor McCormick's discussion. As to the first, he concludes
that "this was probably to be understood as' properly applying only to the denial by a
party of an opponent's previous pleading, and now one who has the burden of pleading a
negative fact as part of his cause of action generally has the accompanying burdens, of
(McCormick, § 318.) And, as to the second exproducing evidence and persuasion."
ception mentioned above, he says that its effect is limited "to. apportioning the burden of
(McCormick, § 318)
producing evidence without affecting the burden of persuasion."
And, for a good example of this, see Duncan v. Great Northern Railway Co., 17 N.D.
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is "a question of policy and fairness based on experience in different situations *,

*

and, for individual instances, there is noth-

ing to do but ascertain the rule, if any, that has been judicially
determined for that particular class of cases."'17 For this reason,
any attempt to formalize a rule for allocating the burden of proof
in all cases would be fruitless and unduly complicate the Uniform
Rules.1s

As to the Nature of the Proof. "Burden of proof", as it is used
in Uniform Rule 1(4), means burden of persuasion. This, of
course, refers to the effect of evidence on the mind of the trier
of fact as to his belief or disbelief of an allegation of fact. In
this respect, it is similar to Model Code rule 1(3) ' and is in accord with modern notions of the meaning of "burden of proof".-"
It is strange, however, that the framers did not follow the Model
Code in adopting the term "burden of persuasion" for Uniform
Rule 1(4) because of the tendency in the judicial opinions to use
"burden of proof' to describe both the burdens of "persuasion" and
of "evidence."'" There is at least one case in North Dakota which is
troublesome for this reason,'2 2 though, as we have observed, the
Supreme Court has endeavored to make the distinction clear. "
However, to adopt the term "burden of persuasion" in lieu of "burden of proof" and the parenthetical- statement in Uniform Rule
1(4) that "burden of proof" is synonomous with "burden of persuasion" would further clarify the distinction and lead to a more
accurate usage.
A somewhat more serious problem in regard to the meaning of
"proof" or "persuasion" arises within the Uniform Rules themselves.
If "burden of proof' in Tniform Rule 1(4) is- as it is said to be
the obligation of a party to persuade, proof necessarily constitutes what McCormick has referred to as the "end-result of conviction or persuasion produced by evidence."24 It then follows
610, 118 N.W. 826 (1908), wherein the court, though speaking in terms of a shifting
of the burden of proof to the defendant because of facts peculiarly within his..knowledge,
actually seems, in reality, only to have been alluding to a shifting of the burden of producing evidence.
As to criminal prosec:tions, see State v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201, 293 N.W. 219 (1940),
wherein the Supreme Court apparently holds that a plea of former jeopardy is an affirmative defense upon which the defendant has the burden of proof.
17. Wigmore, § 2488. See also, McCormick, '§ 318 and McBaine, Burden of Proof:
Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 13-14 (1954).
18.
McBaine, supra note 17.
19.
See note 3'"sura.
20. Wigmore, § 2485; McCormick, § 318; Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the
Anglo-American System of-Litigation 70 et seq. (1956); and McBaine, supra note 17.
21'. Model Code, 73.
22. Duncan v. Great Nbrthern Railway Co., 17 N.D. 610, 118 N.W. 826 (1908), but,
with egard to this case, see note 16 supra.
23. See page 205 supra at note 8.
24. Mcormick,-§ 306..-
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that Uniform Rule 1(3) defining "proof' must be re-examined for
purposes of determining whether it conforms to the intentions of
the framers of the Uniform Rules. In Rule 1(3) "proof" is defined as:
"all of the evidence before the trier of the fact relevant to a
fact in issue which tends to prove the existence or non-existence of such a fact."
The phrase "all of the evidence", as pointed out by Professor
Morgan, surely refers to the quantity or mass of evidence and cannot thus harmonize with the definition of "burden of proof' in Rule
1(4) as a "burden of persuasion".2" "Proof" then, within the
meaning of Rule 1(3), only constitutes one of the two elements
requisite to persuasion or conviction, namely, the mass of evidence.
The other element, that of persuasion, is lacking, unless, we can,
by interpretation, read the element into the Rule. This is, possible
by concluding that since "burden of proof" in Uniform Rule 1(4)
is declared to be synonomous with "burden of persuasion", the
words "to prove" in Uniform Rule 1(3) mean "to persuade" and
hence, "proof" is, as the framers interpret it in the comments to the
rule, "the cumulative effect of evidence."" But, in adopting new
rules of evidence, ve ought not to require immediate judicial interpretation. The language of Uniform Rule 1(3), it seems, would
not only require interpretation, but it confounds the distinction
between the burden of proof and the burden of producing evidence- a distinction which the framers have sought to make clear
by defining the two terms in the Uniform Rules. In other words,
does "proof" mean only the mass of evidence, or only its persuasive
character, or is it both,- that is, "the cumulative effect of evidence".
An alternative to Uniform Rule 1(3) is:
to define "proof" as follows:
"'Proof' is the cumulative effect of all of the evidence revelant to a fact in issue which persuades the
trier of fact of the
27
existence or non-existence of such fact."
As to the Degree of Proof. Some courts still cling to the notion
that a verdict can be based on nothing less than "actual belief" or
a "conviction" of the truth of a fact.2 1 But, as Professor McCormick has said, "it is apparent that an investigation by fallible men
25. Morgan, Presumptions, 10 'Rutgers L. Rev. 512 (1956).
26. Handbook, 165.
27.
It should also be noted that Judge Eugene A. Burdick has already questioned
Uniform Rule 1(3) by proposing that it be amended to provide that " 'Proof' is the
cumulative effect of all of the relevant evidence material to the issues in controversy."
See the letter to Dean 0. H. Thormodsgard, dated December 12, 1957. , .
28. McCormick, § 319.
See also, the thorough analysis of Professor J. P. McBaine,
in McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242, 249-258 (1944).
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based upon the testimony of other men with all their defects of

' 29
veracity, memory and communication, cannot yield certainty."
Though a finding of fact may have, for purposes of the legal controversy, all the consequerces of certainty, it is too much to expect
that the trier of fact ascertain, in every instance, the truth or certainty of what has transpired. Professors McBaine and Morgan
have written convincingly that any such finding can be based rationally only on a weighing of probabilities, ° and some courts, including the Supreme Court of North Dakota within certain limits,
have, with candor, adopted this approach. 1
Similarly, the framers of the Uniform Rules have recognized that
the weighing of probabilities is the mental process involved in

making a finding of fact,12' even though "finding of fact" is defined
in Rule 1(8) as meaning "the determination from proof or judicial
notice of the existence of a fact."-8 In contrast, the Model Code
rule 1(5) defines "finding of fact" as "determining that its existence
is more probable than its non-existence."4 The definition in Uniform Rule 1(8) was selected in preference to that in Model Code
rule 1(5) for the reason that "the actual finding has a legal significance far beyond a finding of probability" and is preferable because it recognizes that a fact, when found, exists in legal contemplation.2
Even so, within the framework of weighing, probabilities, there
must still be a test, or tests, for determining whether the fact exists in legal contemplation, since, depending upon the nature of
the issue or case involved, it is the policy of the law to require
different degrees of proof. " ; If not, how can the judge in a jury
29.
McCormick, § 319. See also, McBaine, supra note 28 at 246.
30.
MeBaine, supra note 28 at 242 et seq.
Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon. Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1933).
31.
McCormick, § 319. The view of the Supreme Court of North Dakota is, in addition to other cases, set forth in Farmers' Mercantile Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 27 N.D.
302, 146 N.W. 550 (1914).
See the discussion at pages 213-216 inf.a.
32.
Handbook, 165.
33.
Uniform Rule 1(8) provides in full: " 'Finding of fact' means the determination
from proof or judicial notice of the existence of a fact.
A ruling implies a supporting
finding of fact; no separate or formal finding is iequired unless required by a statute of
this state."
34.
Model Code rule 1(5) provides in full: " 'Finding a fact' means determining ihat
its existence is more probable than its non-existence. A ruling implies a supporting finding of fact; no separate or formal finding is required."
35. Handbook, 165.
But note Professor Edmund _M. Morgan's criticism as follows:
"If this is intended as a reason for the rejection, it connotes an amazing disregard of
actualities. Of course, the mental process is a weighing of probabilities, but, equally of
course, the result is a determination of the preponderance of the probabilities, and the
obligation is to report the fact as found when the preponderance is of the prescribed
degree.
And, of course, the finding has for the purposes of the case all the consequences of certainty, but, as every lawyer knows, this certainty is only hypotheticaland
is treated as actual only for the purposes of adjusting legal relations between the litigants
and their privies." Morgan, Presumptions, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 512, 521 (1956). 6!
36. Wigmore, §§ 2497 & 2498; McCormick, §§ 319-321.
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case correctly inform the jury as to what is expected of it in resolving disputes of fact or how can the jury be expected to perform its function intelligently and with a purpose of doing justice
between the parties? The tests commonly recognized throughout
the United States, including North Dakota, are: "preponderance of
the evidence" for the ordinary civil cases; 37 "clear and convincing
evidence" where certain types of issues are involved, such as
fraud, 38 suits to declare a deed, absolute in form, to be a mortgage," suits to establish a parol or constructive trust,40 and reformistake; 41 and "beyond a reasonable
mation on grounds of mutual
4
doubt" for criminal cases.
As noted, Uniform Rule 1(4) contains these three commonly
accepted tests as the measures of proof which are to be applied.
It is doubtful, however, that the nile is adequate in this respect unless the terms are somehow defined to render them consistent
among themselves and with the concept of persuasion. 43 Otherwise, the confusion and uncertainty regarding the meaning of
these tests as reflected in past decisions, would, through the Uniform Rules, be perpetuated. Judge and jury would be no better off
than they are at the present in understanding and applying the
tests.
Persuasion, it has been noted, refers to the effect of the evidence
on the mind of the trier of fact. And, consistent with this theory,
it is submitted that the tests employed in Uniform Rule 1(4) are
intended to require a progressively greater degree of belief in the
mind of the trier of fact. Yet, "preponderance of the evidence" and
See also, Reichert v. North37. Fuchs v. Lehman, 47 N.D. 58, 181 N.W. 85 (1920).
ern Pac. By. Co., 39 N.D. 114, 167 N.W.. 127 (1918); Farmers' Mercantile Co. v. Northern Pac. By. Co., 27 N.D. 302, 146 N.W. 550 (1914); Rober v. Northern Pac. By. Co., 25
N.D. 617, 142 N.W. 42 (1913); and Meehan v. Great Northern By. Co., 13 N.D. 432,
101 N.W. 183 (1904).
1956); Reitsch v. McCarty, 35
Engen v. Kincannon, 79 N.W.2d 160 (N.D.
38.
But see, Emanuel v. Engst, 54 N.D. 141, 208 N.W.
N.D. 55, 160 N.W. 694 (1916).
840 (1926), Laskin v. Lee, 50 N.D. 437, 196 N.W. 505 (1923) and Guild v. Moore,
32 N.D. 432, 155 N.W. 44 (1915), wherein the Supreme Court takes the position that,
when taking into consideration the presumption of innocence and fair dealing, fraud need
only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
39. Burr v. Kelley, 74 N.W.2d 428 (N.D. 1956); Mechtle v. Topp, 78 N.D. 789, 52
N.W.2d 842 (1952); Dean v. Smith, 53 N.D. 123, 204 N.W. 987 (1925); Miller v.
Smith, 20 N.D. 96, 126 N.W. 499 (1910); and Jasper v. Hazen, 4 N.D. 1, 58 N.W.
454 (1894).
40. Hendrickson v. Syverson. 82 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. .1957); Shong v. Farmers' &
Merchants State Bank, 70 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1955).
41.
Ives v. Hanson, 66 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1954); Wilson v. Polsfut, 78 N.D. 204,
49 N.W.2d 102 (1951); Wheeler v. Boyer Fire Apparatus Co., 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W.
521 (1933); Forester v. Van Auken, 12 N.D. 175, 96 N.W. 301 (1903)
See also, State v. Myres, 67 N.D. 572,
42.
N. D. Rev. Code § 29-2105 (1943).
274 N.W. 851 (1937); State v. Tucker, 58 N.D. 82, 224 N.W. 878 (1929); State v.
Rice, 39 N.D. 597, 168 NW. 369 (1918).
43. For a somewhat different view, see the comments of Professor McCormick, infra
note 56.
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"clear and convincing evidence" pertain to the quantity and quality of the evidence, apart from denoting any effect-or degree of
effect-of the evidence on the mind of the trier, while proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" necessarily refers to the effect of the
evidence on the mind of the trier.4" The import of the words "preponderance of the evidence", as the courts commonly instruct, is
the weight of the evidence which, as has been suggested, does not
adequately direct the attention, of the jury to the degree of belief
that must be established in their minds to warrant a finding of fact
in the proponent's favor. 41 It may also erroneously focus the attention of the jury on the evidence in a quantitative sense, rather
than its persuasive effect. To illustrate, in Guild v. Moore, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota, in defining "burden of proof",
used the metaphor of a pair of scales as follows:
... when it is said that the burden of proof is on 'A,' that
means that he will lose, unless he shall, at the close of the trial,
have brought down his end of the scale, by placing thereon a
weight of evidence sufficient, first, to destroy the equilibrium,
any weight of evidence placed on
and, second, to overbalance
6
the other end."4

Even though it i implicit from the opinion of the court that the
true test is the persuasive cffect of the evidence,47 such a formulation is completely misleading as to the meaning of "burden of
proof" so far as a "preponderance of the evidence" is concerned."
In North Dakota, as elsewhere, an instruction to the effect that
"preponderance of the evidence" means the number of witnesses
or the amount of the evidence introduced certainly would consti44.
See Morgan, supra note 35 at 512.
45.
See Mc~laine, Burden of F;oof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242, 247
(1944).
46.
32 N.D. 432, 155 N.W. 44, 54 (1915).
• 47. The Supreme Court approved of the following instructions to the jury regarding
the burden of proof: "The law says that unless, upon the various matters where I have
stated that the plaintiff has the burden of proof, he satisfies you of the correctness of the
facts as alleged by him tc such an extent that his proof outweighs the proof of defendant, he cannot prevail in the instances where he has not so satisfied you. In other words,
if the testimony is evenly balanced, it shows that there is some doubt in your mind; that
is not sufficient; that is, if the testimony of the defendant weighs just the same as that of
Id. at 53.
the plaintiff,
you must fiihd for the defendant upon that question."
"
48. On this point, see also the comments of Professor Morgan: "And frequently the
metaphor of a pair of scales is used either by counsel or judge or by both. The evidence
of one party is pictured as being put in one pan and that of the other party in the other
pan, and the pan which has in it the evidence of greater convincing force will tip the
No doubt this ma-Kes clear the concept that the evidence which has the greater
beam.
convincing force preponderates regardless of volume, just as a small piece of gold in one
But it may and is likely to conpan would overbalance a mass of feathers in the others.
vey the highly erroneous idea that the party who has produced evidence of greater conIt is too .plain
vincing force has thereby satisfied the burden of proving or establishing.
for commerit that if the party having the burden introducrs evidence sufficient to jistify
a finding and the opponent rests without offering any evidence, the trier may find for the
opponent. In this instance the evidence introduced must preponderate over none, no matSee Morgan, supra note 35 at 520.
ter how preponderance may be defined."
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tute prejudicial error.i 9 "Preponderance of the evidence" necessarily refers to the persuasive effect of the evidence on the mind of
the trier of fact and a respectable number of decisions so hold.;"
As to the requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" in North
Dakota, analysis demonstrates that it is the intention to require a
higher degree of proof than in the ordinary civil cases and," in
some, a higher degree of proof in terms of the belief of the trier,
for example, such proof as will leave in the mind of the trier "no
hesitation or substantial doubt." -' But there is no uniformity in
meaning, at least, if one can conclude such from the attempt on
the part of the Supreme Court to define the test in terms of a degree of belief in some cases and content itself in others by stating
only that the fact must be proved by "clear and, convincing evidence" which refers only to the quality of the evidence. Only in the
case of the test "beyond a reasonable doubt" is there a description
of the state of mind of the trier of fact. And, interestingly enough,
of the three tests, it is only in connection with the latter, that an
opinion of the Supreme Court has been found in which the Court
bluntly recognized that "reasonable doubt" was almost iicapable
of any definition which would add much to what the words themselves implied?2
If it is desired to retain the familiar terminology describing the
degrees of proof, then it seems imperative that the tests be defined
and foreclose any further opportunity to perpetuate the uncertainty and confusion attending their present usage. How should
they be defined? Professor McBaine suggests that- "[t]he only sound
and defensible hypotheses are that the trier, or triers, of facts can
find what (a) probably has happened, or (b) what highly probably has happened, or (c)what almost certainly has happened." '
In this context it is believed that the degrees of proof would be
more readily understood by judge and jury and facilitate a more
rational application of them. 5 Consistent with his thesis, Professor
49. Cf. Shellberg v. Kuhn, 35 N.D. 448, 160 N.Xi.>504 (1916), wherein the Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the trial court's definition of preponderance
of the evidence led the jury to believe it meant the greater number of witnesses.
50. Kruckenberg v. Stsnton Farmers' Co-op. Elevator Co., 59 N.D.. 371, 230 N.V.
17 (1930).
And, see further, Guild v. Moore, 32 N.D. 432, 155 N.W. 44, 53 (1915)
and the Supreme Court's approval of the trial court's instructions dealing with burden of
proof.
51.
See, for example, Ives v. Hanson, 66 N.VW.2d 802, 805-806 (N.D. 1954).
52.
See, for example, Hendrickson v. Syverson, 82 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1957), citing
Jasper v. Hazen, 4 N.D. 1, 58 N.W. 454 (1894) which so defines "clear and convincing
evidence".
.
53.
State v. Montgomery, 9 N.D. 405, 83 N.W. 873 (1900).
54... McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242, 246-247
(194.4).
55.
See Morgan, Instructing the.Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
Harv. L. Rev. 59, 66 (1933).
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McBaine proposes in a recent article that Uniform Rule 1(5) be
amended to define the three degrees of proof asi follows and it is
suggested that North Dakota lawyers give serious attention to his
proposal.56
"PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. When a rule
of law now is, or hereafter shall be, that a party to a civil
action or proceeding or a criminal prosecution has the obligation of proving facts by a preponderance of the evidence, the
burden of persuasion is as follows:
The trier of fact must believe that it is more probable that
the facts are true or exist than it is that they are false or do not
exist.",7
"CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF. When the rule of
law is, or hereafter shall be, that a party to a civil action or
proceeding or criminal prosecution has the obligation of proving facts by clear and convincing evidence, the burden of persuasion is as follows:
The trier of fact must believe that it is highly probable that
the facts are true or exist."5s

"PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. In prosecutions for crime, or in any civil action or proceeding, when
the rule of law now is or hereafter shall be that the prosecution, or a party to a civil action or proceeding, has or shall
have the obligation of proving guilt of crime, or other facts,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of persuasion is as follows:
The trier of fact must believe beyond a reasonable doubt,
or to a point of almost certainty, that the facts essential to constitute the crime charged are true or exist, or that the facts
asserted in civil actions or proceedings are true or exist.
A reasonable doubt exists when after a comparison and consideration of all the evidence the trier of fact in a criminal prosecution is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt or to almost certainty that the accused committed the crime with
which he is charged; or in a civil action or proceeding is not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt or to almost certainty
that the facts asserted are true.
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because
everything relating to human affairs which must be proved by
evidence is open or subject to possible doubt. The obligation
of the prosecution, or a party to civil actions or proceedings,
56. But see McCormick, § 319, wherein he states, regarding the defining of "preponderance of the evidcnce" that "[miost courts sensibly hold that the phrase is one of
common knowledge, and that it is not necessary to define it."
Similarly, he concludes
that the trial courts should decline to define "reasonable doubt" unless the jury requests
an explanation (Id. at § 321), though he is persuaded that "clear and convincing evidence" might be more "intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they'
must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is 'highly probable.'"
(Id. at§ 320)
57. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 13, .17-18 (1954).
58.
Id. at 18.
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therefore, is not a burden 6f convincing the trier of fact beyond the possibility of a doubt; nor to a certainty."19
Professor Morgan has also recommended similar definitions for
instructing the jury as to the meaning of "preponderance of the
evidence" ' and "clear and convincing evidence",5 ' but has suggested that "attempts to define reasonable doubt by paraphrase or
circumlocution tend only to obfuscate rather than clarify the concept".32 Thus, he may disagree with Professor MeBaine's attempt
to elaborate on a term which he regards as carrying its own meaning. He has said, however, that "there could be no rational objection to charging . . . that the preponderance of probability
must be so great as to baniih all reasonable doubts."' ' This formulation may be regarded as preferable because of its simplicity
and comparative relation to the other two definitions in terms of
the degree of betiof, that is, more probable than not, highly probable, or so probable as to banish all re.onable doubt.
Professor MeBaine also proposes, in connection with each defi'nition, that Uniform Rule 1(5) also be amended to include the
instructions that may be given by the trial judge in defining the
three burdens, though he would not require thiit they be given.'"
It is believed that such modifications in 'Uniform Rule 1(5)
would not constitute a radical departure from 'the existing law in
North Dakota. Certainly, except-perhaps in the case of "clear and
convincing evidence", it would do no -morc'than make explicit
that which is implicit from a study of the North Dakota cases on
the subject. 'But, to this extent, it might prove a more definite and
thi-is helpful state of the law on the subject.' For earifple, regai'ding the meaning of "preponderance of the evidence", in Farmers'
Mercantile Co. v. Northernt Pac. Ry. Co., the Supreme Court very
.clearly adopts the view that to find a fact by a "preponderance' of
the evidence" means a finding that there is a greater probability

59.
Id. at 18.
•60.
"If the trial judge tells the jury that the burden is upon a party to prove a
specified fact by a preponderance of the evidence, he should explain that this means
Only that they must find that the fact does not exist, unless the evidence convinces them
that its existence is more probable than is non-existence."
See note 55 supra at 66.
61.
"In like manner, if he charges that the burden is upon a party to prove a proposition by clear and convincing evidence, or by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence,
he should interpret this by saying tl,t
it requires the jury to be convinced not. only that
the truth of this proposition is more probable than its falsity, but also that its truth is
much more probable than its falsity, though it is not necessary that the preponderance
of probability of its truth shall be so great as to dissipate all reasonable doubt."
See
note 55 supra at 67
62.
See note 55 supra at 63.
63.
See note 55 supra at 67.
64.
For the substance of these instructions, see MeBaine, supra, note 56 at 18-12.
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that a fact exists than it does not.1 The Court,' in quoting from
an earlier Idaho case," said:
"A plaintiff is not bound to exclude the possibility that the
accident might have happened in some other way. . . . He is
only required to satisfy the jury by a fair preponderance of his
evidence that his injury occurred in the manner he contends it
did" and "where the evidence ... is such that it would appear
possible that the injury resulted from any one of several
causes, and yet it points to the greater probability that it resulted from the specific cause charged by the plaintiff . . . the
jury would be justified in returning a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff . . ."6r7
Other decisions support the same, view. 8
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has not attempted to define
"clear and convincing evidence" with particularity in the majority
of cases in which this test has been required. In a few decisions
involving suits to declare a deed a mortgage, to establish parol or
constructive trusts, and to reform instruments on a basis of mutual
mistake, the Supreme Court has said that "clear and convincing
evidence" is such a degree of belief that it will leave in the mind
of the trier of fact "no hesitation or substantial doubt."69 One
would, I should imagine, conclude that, by so defining "clear and
convincing evidence", the Court comes dangerously close to requiring proof "beyond a reasonable, doubt". It may be argued that,
due to the nature of the issues involved, such was the intention of
the Court, but it is not apparent from the decisions. The Court
was defining "clear and convincing evidence" and there is no indication in the opinions that it was requiring what would be tanta65. 27 N.D. 302, 146 N.W. 550 (1914).
66. Adams v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Co., 12 Idaho 637, 89 P. 624 (1907).
67.
See note 65 supri at 555-556.
68.
Trihub v. City of Minot, 74 N.D. 582, 23 N.W.2d 753 (1946); Reichert v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 39 N.D. 114, 167 N.W. 127 (1918); Rober v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 25 N.D. 617, 142 N.W. 42 (1913); and Meehan v. Great Northern By. Co., 13
N.D. 432, 101 N.W. 183 (1904).
But see, Balding v. Andrews, 12 N.D. 267, 96 N.W.
305 (1903), an action for negligence in which the Court said that " 'to justify a verdict,
the law requires not positive proof, it is true, but such proof as will leave no reasonable
doubt of the existence of the fact upon which it must rest . . . if juries could assume
their existenco without suficient evidence and render verdicts upon possibility, probability, and conjecture, the courts would be shorn of their legitimate authority, and the
wise and just rules of the common law, as they have been recognized from time immemorial, would lose their principal value.' " The issue in this case was whether there was
sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury and, North Dakota having rejected the
scintilla rule, the language of the court can possibly be explained on this ground. Howe .e'r,
to the extent that the coiu't speaks of the necessity of a finding being based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the opinion seems clearly erroneous, particularly in the view of
the later cases, supra, even though this aspect of the Balding case has never been
criticized.
69. Dean v. Smith, 53 N.D. 123, 204 N.W. 987, 991 (1925), a suit to declare a
deed, absolute in form, to be a mortgage; Hendrickson v. Syverson, 82 N.W.2d 827, 833
(N.D. 1957), a suit to establish a constructive trust; and Forester v. Van Auken, 12
N.D. 175, 96 N.W. 301, 305 (1903), a suit to reform an instrument on grounds of
mutual mistake.
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mount to the degree of proof required in criminal prosecutions.
If, of course, it was the intention of the court to apply this degree
of proof then it should have boldly said so. It might be contended
that the Court, by the phraseology, only intended no "considerable" or "large" doubt, as distinguished from no "reasonable
doubt", but this is a nebulous distinction and somewhat ambiguous
in itself. The meaning of "clear and convincing evidence" is further complicated by at least two cases in which the Court has gone
so far as to suggest that a finding can be made "only upon the
certainty" of the fact.7 ° This, as already suggested, is to ignore the
realities of the fact-finding process and demand even more than
is required in criminal prosecutions. Needless to say, this is an
area in which the North Dakota law could stand more definitive
expression and Professor McBaine's definition of "clear and convincing proof" provides one answer. And, in the last analysis, to require a finding that a fact "highly probably" exists may not be too
far removed from what the Supreme Court has in mind, if one
keeps in mind the comparative degrees of belief approach that the
Supreme Court clearly appears to adhere. This meaning of "clear
and convincing evidence" is not, however, readily apparent from
the decided cases.
How has "reasonable doubt" been defined in North Dakota? 71
In an early case, the Supreme Court defined it as "an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge" and,7'2 in a
later decision, amplified this by stating that "a possible or speculative doubt" was not sufficient.7
Even so, in the absence of a request, it is not error for the trial court to omit a definition of 'reasonable doubt", 7 unless the failure to give an instruction amounts
to a misdirection.7: This is probably due to the attitude of the
Supreme Court, as expressed in an early case, that the term is
"almost incapable of any definition which will add much to what
the words themselves imply.";" Thus, even though the North Da70. Ives v. Hanson, 66 N.W.2d 802, 806 (N.D. 1954) and Wheeler v. Boyer Fire
Apparatus Co., 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W. 521 (1933), both suits to reform art instrument for mutual mistake.
71.
For the statutory requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see N. D.
Rev. Code § 29-2105 (1943).
See also, State v. Myres, 67 N.D. 572, 274 N.W. 851
(1937); State v. Tucker, 58 N.D. 62, 224 N.W. 878 (1929); and State v. Rice, 39

N.D.

597, 168 N.W. 369 (1918).

72. Territory
73. State v.
74.
State v.
gomery, 9 N.D.
75.
State v.
76. State v.
supra note 73.

v. Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 46 N.W. 597 (1877).
Libernan, 59 N.D. 252, 229 N.W. 363 (1930).
Glass, 29l N.D. 620, 151 N.W. 229 (1915)
(dictum); State v. Mont405, 83 N.W. 873 (1900)
(dictum).
Gibson,
9 N.D. 70, 284 N.W. 209 (1939).__
Montgomery, 9 N.D. 405, 83 N.W. 873, 875 (1900); State v. Liberman,
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kota definition of "reasonable doubt" does
from thatsuggested by Professor McBaine,
action may be to adopt Professor Morgan's
defining it as "a preponderance of probability
77
all reasonable doubt."

(To

1 77.

BE CONTINUED)

See page 213 supra and note 55 supra at 67.
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not differ materially
the wiser course of
approach by simply
so great as to banish

